The existing hospitality literature describes how global diversification in the hotel industry looks for a broader presence regardless of existing global representation. However, the finance literature reports a negative impact from global diversification because of the potentially higher cost of coordinating corporate policies. Moreover, agency problems can increase along with the size of the firm. This study measures the wealth impact of hotel global diversification on bidders at the time of international acquisition announcements. We find significant abnormal positive returns on the day of the announcement.
Introduction
The hotel industry is considered to be one of the global leaders in the service sector economy. Global diversification in the hotel industry has been in response to increasing international travel. As reported by Litteljohn (1997) , international arrivals increased by a factor of more than 25 times between 1950 and 1990. U.S. hotel chains have expanded largely through acquisitions of other chains with an existing global network (Cruz & Wolchuk, 1998) . Research indicates that the ability to be located in strategically-placed countries and/or "gateway cities" is believed to be an important way to help develop a hotel brand (Whitla, Walters & Davies, 2007) .
However, there are no previous studies to demonstrate the financial impact of global diversification on the hotel industry. There has been some other work done in the restaurant industry, but the evidence is contradictory. Hua and Upneja (2007) show a significant and negative relationship between a restaurant firm being "international" and market capitalization (used by the authors as a proxy for size). On the other hand, Hua and Upneja (2008) find a significantly positive relationship between foreign earnings and firm value (also measured by market capitalization).
Further conflicts between international expansion and firm value enhancement exist in the finance literature. Research by Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) indicates there is a valuation discount attributable to global diversification. Thus, the purpose of this study is to attempt to determine if hotel global diversification makes a positive wealth impact or not for shareholders during the period surrounding acquisition announcements.
Literature Review
Hotel firms have pursued global expansion strategies. For example, both Holiday Inn and Hilton have properties in seventy countries (Whitla, Walters & Davies, 2007) . According to Whitla, et. al (2007) , many hotel chains that are geographically diverse continue to seek non-domestic locations. This appears to be a smart decision given tourism projections. The world-wide average annual growth rate of international tourist arrivals from 1995 to 2020 was 4.1 percent. This outpaces the projected growth rate of 3.8 percent for the Americas and 3.1 percent for Europe. Moreover, these rates are below that of other regions with Africa at 5.5 percent, East Asia and the Pacific at 6.5 percent, the Middle East at 6.7 percent and South Asia at 6.2 percent (World Tourism Organization, 2008) . 1
There are a number of motivations for conducting international acquisitions (Hopkins, 1999) . Strategic motives are those where the acquiring firm intends to create synergy and provide complimentary resources. The market motive is based upon entering new markets in new countries. Similar to the strategic motive, the economic motive involves establishing economies of scale, reducing the duplication of resources and subsequently reducing the undervaluation of the target firm. However, globalization has a dark side in that a high degree of market integration may increase competition and could result in cultural clashes (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005) .
Previous studies highlight both the positive and negative impact of global diversification on firm value. One positive impact is based on the internationalization theory of synergy. This occurs as firms process valuable information-based assets by bringing buyers and sellers within the same firm and internalizing (Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002) . Without this process, information-based assets would be hard to sell. Global diversification increases intangible assets and increases the value of the firm (Morck & Yeong, 1992) .
Although globalization could produce cultural clashes as discussed by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) , multinational firms can take advantage of price changes and tax codes. Moreover, global diversification satisfies investors' desire for risk reduction through diversification (Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002) . If a firm's global diversification costs less than individual global diversification, investors are willing to invest in a globally diversified firm.
Nevertheless, there are potential negative impacts of globalization as well. One of these is the high cost of coordinating corporate policies (Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002) . One such cost could be the information asymmetry between headquarters and international divisions. In addition, an agency problem could develop because of managers engaging in "empire-building" by raising more assets under their control (Jensen, 1986) . Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that U.S. firms acquiring non-domestic firms have significantly lower stock returns during the announcement period than those firms that acquire domestic firms. Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) find that international diversification results in greater valuation discounts than those associated with the acquisition of domestic firms. Lee (2008) examines the relationship between lodging firm performance and internationalization (either through acquisition or development) for the period 1997 to 2006. Moreover, his study focuses primarily on properties in Europe and Asia. He finds a U-shaped relationship between Tobin's Q (roughly the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity) and internationalization for all foreign properties, but a linear relationship between Tobin's Q and internationalization to Asian countries.
The effect of international diversification on firm performance can vary by industry. Capar and Kotabe (2003) examine the German service industry and find a curvilinear relationship between international diversification and performance. International diversification tends to decrease performance up to a certain level because of the reduced economies of scale associated with large expansions. Thus, larger service firms do not perform as well as their smaller counterparts.
This study focuses on hotel industry globalization, which involves real estate decisions (either securitized or non-securitized properties). The literature on the benefits of international diversification of real estate assets shows mixed results. Diversification of securitized properties is beneficial because real estate returns have lower cross correlations than common stock or bond investments due to local factors (Eichholtz, 1996) . Therefore, international portfolios of real assets have higher expected returns at lower risk. Gordon, Canter and Webb (1998) construct a global mixed-asset portfolio with U.S. financial assets along with U.S. and international real estate securities. Their findings show benefits from international diversification in holding securitized real estate in a portfolio.
Some literature does not support international diversification of securitized properties. Mull and Soenen (1997) and Wilson and Zurbrugg (2003) find that the inclusion of U.S. REITs in mixed-asset foreign portfolios does not significantly increase risk-adjusted returns for the years between 1985 and 1994 . When Stevenson (2000 uses securitized real estate data across ten countries, he finds no evidence for the international diversification benefits in the mixed-asset portfolio. Thus, it is empirical question whether international hotel acquisitions will have positive impact on the firm surrounding the time of the acquisition announcement.
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One way for a hotel firm to become global is through acquisition of existing firms (Cruz & Wolchuk, 1998) . Hotel acquisitions in the United States have different outcomes as compared to acquisitions in other industries. When a hotel bidder acquires another hotel target firm through merger or tender offer in the U.S., the bidder's returns are significantly positive on the announcement day (Canina, 2001; Kwansa, 1994) . This positive bidder returns are generated for a number of reasons. Better managers in the acquiring firm create efficiencies and provide better performance after the firms merge. The newly merged firm reduces redundant facilities and offers better product and service. In addition, increased market power raises performance (Canina, 2001 ).
While hotel acquiring firms have positive returns at the domestic acquisition announcement, shareholders of acquiring firms in other industries have mixed returns. Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarize event studies regarding corporate takeovers and find that shareholders of bidding firms do not make gains (they don't lose either). They also dispute that any gains increase market power. Overall, the evidence for a positive impact on bidder firms in non-hospitality industries remains unclear.
One measure of a firm's worth is excess value. Excess value is defined as the difference between the actual market value and weighted sum of the divisional value. When firms expand through acquisition and increase their business segments, excess value has shown to decline during the two years following the acquisition (Graham, Lemmon & Wolf, 2002) . The main reason that excess value is reduced is because the discounted target unit is added to the acquiring firm. In the hotel industry, undiversified hotel firms have better profit growth and better market return performance than diversified hotel firms (Lee & Jang, 2007) . Thus, diversification may not be a good strategy for hotel firms based on recent research.
Data and Methodology

Sample and Data Description
This study uses a sample of U.S. hotel acquiring firms from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) International Merger and Acquisition Database (SDC-IMAD) for the period 1986-2004. U.S. hotel acquiring firms should have foreign hotels as their target with complete acquisitions. Both acquiring firms and targets are classified with the 7011 SIC code (hotel industry). Stock returns for acquiring firms should be available. A total of 21 global acquisition deals were retrieved. Hotel acquisitions can be taken by either all the assets or partial assets. Since partial acquisition barely affects the equity value of acquirer (Sheel & Nagpal, 2000) , our study used deals with transaction values more than $7 million or announced at the major news wires.
Estimation of abnormal stock returns
To measure the acquisition performance of the acquiring firms, this study uses the market model. Previous hospitality literature (Kwansa, 1994 , Sheel & Nagpal, 2000 Oak & Andrew, 2005) also uses the market model. This study uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression market model to calculate excess returns. Brown and Warner (1985) show how to calculate excess return measures. R jt. is defined as the observed arithmetic return for security j at day t. A jt. is defined as excess return for security j at day t. mt R is the return on the CRSP equallyweighted market index over day t. The equation is shown below.
αˆand j βˆare estimates of α j and β j by regressing R jt on mt R over the estimation period preceding the event window.
The estimation period range from t = -255 to t = -46 which is relative to the initial date of acquisition announcement day t = 0. For the every day in the event period, the excess return (A jt ) is averaged to make the sample mean
where N is the securities number in the sample and t is the trading day relative to the event day. From thirty day prior to and end with thirty day after the international acquisition announcement, the cumulative abnormal return ( 
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The significance of cumulative abnormal returns is tested by a nonparametric rank test (Corrado, 1989; Nicolau, 2002; Oak & Andrew, 2005) . The rank test is useful under highly nonnormal distributions and also misspecification problem of other parametric tests due to the event-date excess return variance increases (Corrado, 1989) . The rank test (Nicolau, 2002; Oak & Andrew, 2005 ) is calculated by:
Where K it = rank of the abnormal returns in the time series estimated for the security i, N=the number of securities, and T=the total number of days being observed. Eventus software (Cowan, 2005 ) is used to estimate cumulative abnormal returns and the significance test. This test will be used to test the following research hypothesis shown below. Research hypothesis: Hotel global acquisition announcements positively impact the returns of the acquirer.
Discussion of Results
While we retrieved ninety-five global acquisition deals from the SDC, only twenty-one deals were used due to the lack of stock return data. Seven companies with twenty-one deals are distributed over sixteen years. ITT Corporation has the largest number of deals (ten) and other hotel corporations have one to three deals. ITT Corporation and Choice Hotels International Inc. acquired shares partially twice from CIGA and Flag Choice Hotel. We used this sample of deals to calculate the mean abnormal stock returns of the acquirers for the event period (30 days before the announcement to 30 days after the announcement). The results are shown in Table 1 . *, **, ***: significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels using a 1-tail test.
There were significant, positive returns for global hotel acquirers on the day of acquisition announcement (day 0). This result for international hotel acquisitions is similar to the result for firms making domestic lodging acquisitions (Canina, 2001) . Our results show that the acquiring firms' abnormal return percentage is positive and significantly different from zero on the acquisition announcement day. Canina's total sample (both mergers and tender offers) shows a mean abnormal return percentage on the announcement day of approximately 1.28 percent. Our mean return on day 0 is approximately half of that, or .62 percent. Nevertheless, it is positive and significant. This is also consistent with the previous result (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005) that US acquirers with international targets have lower announcement returns than those with domestic targets.
We run a similar test delineating the prior sample into three periods: 30 days' prior to the announcement day, one day prior to the announcement and 30 days' after the announcement. This is shown in Table 2 . The abnormal return from one day prior to the announcement to the announcement day is significant and positive, as expected. In table 2 the cumulative abnormal return is insignificantly negative before and after thirty days of acquisition announcement. It means that acquiring firms neither lose nor gain in the (-30 to -2) and (+1 to +30) periods.
Conclusions and recommendations for further research
This study examines evidence of whether shareholders of U.S. hotel firms gain wealth when international acquisitions are announced. No previous studies have focused solely on hotel international acquisitions using event study methodology. This study supports the notion that hotel international acquisitions produce positive abnormal returns. The result shows that mean abnormal return is significantly positive at the day of announcement. In the period (-30 to-2) and (+1 to +30), cumulative abnormal return is insignificantly negative. The most important finding in this study is that international hotel acquisitions produce significant positive returns on the day of announcement like domestic hotel acquisitions.
One limitation of this study is small sample size. Although there were a total of 95 deals, the database we accessed only had return data on 21. Future studies could examine the abnormal returns (if any) for hotel REITs mergers and acquisitions. Given the limited amount of research on international hospitality acquisitions, it would be interesting to investigate global acquisition in either the restaurant or casino industries as well.
Finally, we noticed that our mean abnormal return of .62 percent for bidder's on announcement day was about half of that calculated by Canina (2001) of 1.28 percent for domestic takeovers. Although they are different, the sample years were similar (1982 ( -2000 ( for Canina, 1986 ( -2004 for this study). That fact that our mean abnormal return on announcement day for bidders making international acquisitions is about half of those making domestic acquisitions may be an indication of the valuation discount for global diversification as argued by Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) . Further investigation into the existence of such a discount in the field of hospitality acquisitions could be warranted.
